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Abstract
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence accumulation is one of the
main tools for combining data obtained from multiple sources. In this
paper a special case of combination of two bodies of evidence with
non-zero conflict coefficient is considered. It is shown that application
of the Dempster-Shafer rule of combination in this case leads to an
evaluation of masses of the combined bodies that is different from the
evaluation of the corresponding probabilities obtained by application
of the law of total probability. This finding supports the view that
probabilistic interpretation of results of the Dempster-Shafer analysis
in the general case is not appropriate.
Key words: data fusion, Dempster-Shafer theory, evidence accumu-
lation, probability, uncertainty.
1 Introduction
The greatest enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, it is the illusion of knowl-
edge
Stephen Hawking
Data fusion is the first stage of a complex decision making process. This
stage usually involves combination of uncertain, incomplete, and/or difficult-
to-compare information obtained from multiple sources. The principal goals
of this task are to decrease uncertainty associated with individual measure-
ments and to permit identification of the most likely alternative. One of
the main tools for data fusion is the Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory of evi-
dence accumulation [5], [13]. The DS theory has been used in many areas
of science and engineering, including sensor fusion, medical diagnostics, im-
age processing, biometrics, and decision support. A review of some of these
applications is given in [3].
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In this work we focus on certain key aspects of the relationship between
the DS and probability theories, following up on prior work on this sub-
ject. Recently, an investigation of the algebraic structure of the DS set of
mass assignments was undertaken and it was shown that this set can be
mapped onto the set of probabilities by a semigroup homomorphism [4].
In particular, it was demonstrated that the combination of mass from the
singleton DS set is in the abstract-algebraic sense equivalent to the combi-
nation of probabilities. While a naive interpretation of this result supports
the proposition that the DS theory in the non-singleton case is, in a certain
sense, a generalization of probability theory [2], there is an evidence that
the two data fusion approaches differ in several respects that seem to defy
such interpretation [7].
Recently, several cases where the results of DS evidence accumulation
might present interpretation difficulties from the probability theory stand-
point have been observed. In one of these cases two bodies of evidence
with mass assignments 0.99, 0.00, 0.01 and 0.00, 0.99, 0.01 are combined.
This results in the masses associated with the decision set 0.00, 0.00, 1.00
- an outcome that is deemed undesirable [15]. This result occurs due to
strongly contradictory beliefs about the first two elements. The problem
can be relieved to some extent by replacing the zero mass assignments with
appropriately small but non-zero values, but it is not clear that an arbitrary
resolution of such contradictions is desirable.
In another case two events, one random and one with an uncertain out-
come, are jointly evaluated [6]. Both probabilistic and DS analyses yield
likelihood estimates of the combined events equal to the probability of the
random event. This result is sometimes considered unsatisfactory, as the
fusion process does not appear to improve upon probability estimates of in-
dividual events [6]. The result, however, is consistent with the frameworks
of both analyses, and presents no interpretation difficulties in a more general
case, where the latter event is only partly uncertain.
This paper, by contrast, identifies a large class of bodies of evidence
associated with non-zero conflict coefficient and yielding different DS and
probabilistic evaluations that cannot be easily reconciled. The outcome sets
are given by partitions and quasi-partitions of the set of evidence, which cor-
respond to the cases of zero and non-zero mass assignments to the universal
set, respectively. The finding contradicts a key result, an inequality that
relates probabilistic and DS evaluations and thereby casts doubt on the le-
gitimacy of probabilistic interpretation of the DS mass assignment when the
DS rule of combination is used. This outcome supports the view expressed
among others by Pearl that despite the formal similarity (and the precise
algebraic relationship that was established between the two calculi in [4])
the DS and probabilistic approaches to evidence accumulation are separate
theories with distinct objectives [10], [11].
2 Basic formulas
Denote by Ω a finite non-empty set of all possible outcomes of an event of
interest, and by 2Ω the power set of Ω. Define the set of observable outcomes,
called the set (of subsets) of evidence, by
A = {Ai | 0 < i ≤ |A|} ⊆ 2
Ω, A 6= ∅, (1)
where |A| is the cardinality of A, and ⊆ denotes ”is a subset of”.
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Given the set A in (1), define a mapping
mA : 2
Ω 7→ [0, 1], (2)
such that
mA(∅) = 0 (3)
and ∑
mA(Ai) = 1. (4)
Set mAi = mA(Ai) and call it the mass of Ai. By an abuse of notation we
will also write
mA = {mAi | 0 < i ≤ |A|}, (5)
and refer to mA as the mass assignment of A. Finally, we will call the set
of pairs of the subsets Ai and the corresponding masses mAi ,
A = {(Ai,mAi) | 0 < i ≤ |A|}, (6)
the body of evidence of A.
The key difference between probability and mass is that probability is a
measure and therefore it satisfies the additivity condition, that is, given a
finite sequence Ai, 0 < i ≤ |A|, of disjoint subsets of A,
P
(⋃
Ai
)
=
∑
P (Ai). (7)
In general, mass does not satisfy condition (7). Removing the additivity con-
straint can be convenient, as it permits inclusion of subjective judgments in
the DS information fusion system, but it also has the undesirable conse-
quence of making the interpretation of results of such fusion uncertain. In
particular, when considered together with the DS rule of combination, it
is not always clear when mass can be made consistent with the standard
probability evaluation.
Here we address this issue in a limited way by constraining mass to
satisfy the additivity condition. We identify mass with probability, combine
bodies of evidence according to the DS rule, and test if mass of the combined
bodies agrees with the corresponding probabilities. The additivity constraint
imposed on mass allows us to focus on partitions and on bodies of evidence
with no contradictory mass assignments. In the remainder of this section
we explain the focus on partitions, introduce the DS rule of combination,
describe the auxiliary concepts of balance and plausibility, and identify a
key inequality linking probability and DS theories.
In general, A may contain all non-trivial subsets of 2Ω. For example,
when A = {a, b, c}, it is possible thatA = {a, b, c, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}}.
Here, we restrict A to be a partition of Ω, i.e.,
Ai
⋂
i 6=j
Aj = ∅ and
⋃
Ai = Ω, (8)
or a quasi-partition of Ω, i.e.,
Ai
⋂
i 6=j 6=|A|
Aj = ∅,
⋃
i 6=|A|
Ai = Ω and A|A| = Ω. (9)
3
The latter case arises when the available information is uncertain, i.e., when
mΩ 6= 0. The reason for the restriction of sets of evidence to partitions is
that it simplifies the analysis without removing generality: provided con-
dition (7) is satisfied, bodies of evidence having overlapping sets can be
replaced by bodies of evidence having no overlapping sets. For example,
the set {{a, b}, {b, c}} can be replaced by the sets {{a, b}, c} and {a, {b, c}}.
Similarly, the set {{a, b}, {a, b, c}, d} can be replaced by the set {{a, b}, c, d}.
A key feature of the DS theory is the rule for combining bodies of ev-
idence. Let A and B be two distinct bodies of evidence. Suppose a rule
for combining the sets of evidence A and B and mapping the result to a
decision set C,
C = A▽B, (10)
is given by a partition of the set
{Ai ∩Bj | 0 < i ≤ |A|, 0 < j ≤ |B|}. (11)
Assume an appropriate rule ▽ is given. The DS rule for combining the
masses of A and B is then
mCk =
1
1− κ
∑
Ai∩Bj=Ck
mAimBj , 0 < k ≤ |C|, (12)
where
κ =
∑
Ai∩Bj=∅
mAimBj 6= 1
1 (13)
is the conflict coefficient and
C = {(Ck,mCk) | 0 < k ≤ |C|} (14)
is the DS composite body of evidence.
Apart from mass, two other concepts are key in the DS theory: balance
and plausibility. Balance (or, belief) of a subset Ai is the sum of the masses
of all subsets Aj of A, that are also subsets of Ai, i.e.,
bAi =
∑
Aj⊆Ai
mAj , 0 < i ≤ |A|. (15)
Plausibility of a subset Ai is the sum of the masses of all subsets Aj of A,
having non-empty intersection with Ai, i.e.,
pAi =
∑
Ai∩Aj 6=∅
mAj , 0 < i ≤ |A|. (16)
Like mass, balance and plausibility are mappings from the power set of Ω
to the unit interval. In particular,
b∅ = p∅ = 0 (17)
1 In general, 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1. κ = 1 iff
⋃
Ai ∩
⋃
Bj = ∅, a satisfactory result, since then
A and B cannot be combined to form a decision set. For example, there might be bodies
of evidence allowing one to evaluate outcomes ”a tree is a poplar but not an oak” and ”a
tree is a cedar but not a pine”, but these cannot be combined to form a body of evidence
allowing one to evaluate an outcome ”a tree is deciduous but not coniferous”.
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and
bΩ = pΩ = 1. (18)
Moreover, balance and plausibility are related by the formula
pAi = 1− bA¯i , 0 < i ≤ |A|, A¯i = Ω−Ai. (19)
Due to Rota’s generalization of the Mo¨bius inversion theorem [12], mass can
be uniquely recovered from balance by the formula
mAj =
∑
Ai⊆Aj
(−1)|Aj−Ai|bAi , 0 < j ≤ |A|. (20)
A similar formula exists for plausibility [13]; the two formulas ensure that
no information is lost in the process of performing (15) or (16).
A key result in DS theory describes the relationship among balance,
plausibility and probability. It follows from (15) and (16) that
bAi ≤ pAi , 0 < i ≤ |A|. (21)
A stronger version of (21) that allows comparison of results of DS and prob-
abilistic analyses has been proposed by Dempster [5] for the situation where
mass assignment arises from a set-valued mapping from a probability space
to Ω,
bAi ≤ P (Ai) ≤ pAi , 0 < i ≤ |A|. (22)
Of particular importance to us are certain special cases. It follows from (8)
and (9) that the condition (22) can be replaced by the condition
bAi = P (Ai) ≤ pAi , 0 < i ≤ |A|, (23)
when A is a quasi-partition of Ω, and by the condition
bAi = P (Ai) = pAi , 0 < i ≤ |A|, (24)
when A is a partition of Ω. Since balance and plausibility bound the value
of probability, they are often referred to as the lower and upper probabilities.
A verification of validity of condition (22) and of its special cases, conditions
(23) and (24), is the main goal of this paper.
3 Combining bodies of evidence
We analyze two cases of combining two bodies of evidence, both with a non-
zero conflict coefficient, and both yielding inconsistent DS and probabilistic
evaluations. In the first case the uncertainty mass of both bodies of evidence
is zero. In the second case the uncertainty mass of one of the two bodies of
evidence is non-zero. While the latter is a straightforward extension of the
former, both cases are included for their pedagogical value.
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3.1 mΩ = 0 and κ 6= 0
Consider the following two sets of evidence,
A
.
= {A1, A2} = {a, {b, c}} (25)
and
B
.
= {B1, B2} = {{a, b}, c}, (26)
having mass assignments
mA
.
= {mA1 ,mA2} =
{
1
4
,
3
4
}
(27)
and
mB
.
= {mB1 ,mB2} =
{
1
2
,
1
2
}
. (28)
Suppose the set combination rule is given by
C = A▽B
.
= {C1 = A1 ∩B1, C2 = A2 ∩B1, C3 = A2 ∩B2}
= {a, b, c}. (29)
We seek to obtain first, the mass of subsets of C,
mC
.
= {mC1 ,mC2 ,mC3}, (30)
and second, the associated lower and upper probabilities.
Since A1 ∩ B2 = ∅, the conflict coefficient κ = mA1mB2 6= 0. It follows
from equation (12) that the mass of C1, C2 and C3 is then
mC1 =
mA1mB1
1−mA1mB2
=
1
4
1
2
1− 1
4
1
2
=
1
7
, (31)
mC2 =
mA2mB1
1−mA1mB2
=
3
4
1
2
1− 1
4
1
2
=
3
7
(32)
and
mC3 =
mA2mB2
1−mA1mB2
=
3
4
1
2
1− 1
4
1
2
=
3
7
. (33)
Since C is a partition, then mCi = bCi = pCi , i = 1, 2, 3, and we are done.
Suppose the mass assignments (27) and (28) coincide with probabilities.
We will treat these two mass assignments as partial information about a
fixed probability distribution that we seek to derive. It follows then, that
P (C1) = P (A1) =
1
4
, (34)
P (C2) = P (A2)− P (B2) =
3
4
−
1
2
=
1
4
(35)
and
P (C3) = P (B2) =
1
2
. (36)
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Comparing rhs of equations (31)-(33) and (34)-(36), we have
mCi 6= P (Ci), i = 1, 2, 3, (37)
and therefore the condition (24) is not satisfied.
To verify if the result in (37) is an anomaly, consider a general case,
given by the mass assignment
mA = {x, 1− x} (38)
and
mB = {y, 1 − y}, (39)
0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1. Then from equation (12)
mC1 =
mA1mB1
1−mA1mB2
=
xy
1− x(1− y)
, (40)
mC2 =
mA2mB1
1−mA1mB2
=
(1− x)y
1− x(1− y)
(41)
and
mC3 =
mA2mB2
1−mA1mB2
=
(1− x)(1 − y)
1− x(1− y)
. (42)
As before, suppose the mass assignment (38)-(39) coincides with probabili-
ties. It then follows from (25)-(26) and (38)-(39) that
P (C1) = P (A1) = x, (43)
P (C2) = P (B1)− P (A1) = y − x (44)
and
P (C3) = P (B2) = 1− y. (45)
Comparing rhs of equations (40)-(42) and (43)-(45), it follows that mass
and probabilities are equal and therefore the condition (24) is satisfied if
and only if x = 0 and y is arbitrary, or y = 1 and x is arbitrary. This
condition is equivalent to the condition κ = 0.
3.2 mΩ 6= 0 and κ 6= 0
Consider the following two sets of evidence,
A
.
= {A1, A2, A3} = {a, {b, c}, {a, b, c}} (46)
and
B
.
= {B1, B2} = {{a, b}, c}, (47)
having mass assignments
mA
.
= {mA1 ,mA2 ,mA3} = {x, x¯, 1 − x− x¯} (48)
and
mB
.
= {mB1 ,mB2} = {y, 1− y} , (49)
7
where 0 ≤ x+ x¯, y ≤ 1. Suppose the set combination rule is given by
C = A▽B
.
= {C1 = A1 ∩B1, C2 = A2 ∩B1,
C3 = A2 ∩B2 ∪ A3 ∩B2, C4 = A3 ∩B1}
= {a, b, c, {a, b}}. (50)
We seek to obtain
mC
.
= {mC1 ,mC2 ,mC3 ,mC4}, (51)
and the associated values of balance and plausibility. Since A1∩B2 = ∅, the
conflict coefficient κ = mA1mB2 = x(1 − y) 6= 0, except in the trivial case.
It follows from equation (12) that the masses of C1, C2, C3 and C4 are then
mC1 =
mA1mB1
1−mA1mB2
=
xy
1− x(1− y)
, (52)
mC2 =
mA2mB1
1−mA1mB2
=
x¯y
1− x(1− y)
, (53)
mC3 =
mA2mB2 +mA3mB2
1−mA1mB2
=
(1− x)(1 − y)
1− x(1− y)
, (54)
and
mC4 =
mA3mB1
1−mA1mB2
=
(1− x− x¯)y
1− x(1− y)
, (55)
where x(1 − y) 6= 1, and, from equations (15)-(16) that the corresponding
balances and plausibilities are, respectively
bC
.
= {bC1 , bC2 , bC3} = {mC1 ,mC2 ,mC3} (56)
and
pC
.
= {pC1 , pC2 , pC3} = {mC1 +mC4 ,mC2 +mC4 ,mC3} . (57)
The objective, as before, is to evaluate the consistency of results gener-
ated by identification of DS masses with probabilities. Equating the proba-
bility of c with the mass of B2, we have
P (c) = 1− y. (58)
Furthermore, since by (56) and (57),
mC3 = bC3 = pC3 , (59)
then, by (22) and (50),
mC3 = P (C3) = P (c). (60)
Combining the last two results yields
1− y =
(1− x)(1− y)
1− x(1− y)
. (61)
Equation (61) is satisfied if and only if x = 0 or y = 0 or y = 1. The first
and the last case imply κ = 0. The second case implies κ = x. However,
since P (c) = 1 then P (a) = 0 and therefore, as before, x = 0.
8
Similarly inconsistent evaluations are obtained for the singletons a and
b. The evaluations of P (b) for x = 1/4, x¯ = 1/2 and y = 1/2 are particularly
revealing. Substituting x and y in (53) and (55) and proceeding as before
leads to the DS evaluation
2
7
≤ P (b) ≤
3
7
(62)
and the probability evaluation
0 ≤ P (b) ≤
1
4
. (63)
Note that the two evaluations are not merely different - they do not over-
lap! This anomaly cannot be relieved by renormalization of balance and
plausibility suggested in [2]; in fact the problem then becomes even more
severe.
It follows from the preceding argument that given two bodies of evidence
equipped with an arbitrary mass assignment and an arbitrary set combina-
tion rule, but satisfying the non-zero conflict coefficient condition, use of
the DS rule of combination can yield a mass assignment for the combined
body of evidence that is inconsistent with probabilities, thereby violating
the inequality (22).
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